In reality, most voluntary agreements with polluters (VAs) are not enforceable in the sense that no legal tools are available to enforce …rms'commitments. We examine whether such VAs are able to achieve an e¢ cient level of environmental protection when they are obtained under the legislative threat of a pollution quota.
Introduction
In environmental policy, a Voluntary Agreement (VA hereafter), whereby polluting …rms voluntarily commit to control pollution, has become a major policy innovation of the last decade. While the use of VAs was limited initially to a few countries (e.g., Germany, Japan), they are now used extensively around the world, particularly to deal with industrial greenhouse gas emissions and waste. The use of the term "voluntary" has long been disputed since many agreements are in fact obtained under the threat of an alternative legislative intervention. The present paper focuses on such agreements preempting legislation.
In most countries, VAs are not binding. As a result, no legal tools are available to enforce …rms'commitments. For instance, this is the case in Canada, France, Germany and the United States. To the best of our knowledge, the only exceptions are the UK Climate Change agreements and the Dutch "covenants" which are made enforceable through their connection with mandatory regulation. A few countries (e.g., Belgium) have tried to set up a legal framework to promote enforceable agreements with varying results essentially because most companies are reluctant to enter into binding schemes.
Non-enforceability contributes to a widespread suspicion among observers about VAs ability to genuinely improve the environment. However, this property does not imply that compliance incentives are completely lacking. The legislative threat which initiates the voluntary commitment of polluters also promotes compliance ex post since the parties to the VA contract are all aware that, in case of noncompliance, the threat will be acted upon. But non-compliance cannot be observed immediately after the contract comes into force. Furthermore, once it is discov-ered, enacting a new legislation takes time. In the end, several years necessarily elapse before the non-complying polluters bear the cost of the legislation. This obviously creates adverse incentives. In particular, …rms may enter strategically into voluntary agreements without any willingness to comply, just to postpone legislative intervention.
In this paper, we develop a model of a non-enforceable agreement between a polluter and a benevolent regulator to address these issues. We examine whether this type of VA can lead to an e¢ cient level of pollution abatement and how this level compares to both the …rst-best level and the level that might have been imposed legislatively. We make two crucial assumptions. First, the legislative threat is determined endogenously. More speci…cally, we explicitly model a legislative process in which the polluter lobbies a Congress, thereby reducing the stringency of mandated abatement. Otherwise, a benevolent regulator would have absolutely no reason to use a VA since it could impose the …rst-best legislation directly. Second, we assume that the regulator can only punish a non-complying polluter by implementing the threat in the future. In this context, the polluter's propensity to comply is driven by the endogenous stringency of the legislative quota and by the rate at which he discounts the cost of future legislation.
We do not know of any previous contribution dealing with non-enforceable VAs 1 . Some work in this …eld has explored the role of legislative threats in triggering voluntary abatement [4, 9, 10, 14] 2 . But they all assume perfect compliance.
This obviously in ‡uences the analysis and the results obtained. In particular, polluters do not enter into perfectly enforceable VAs to delay legislative intervention as in our case.
Amacher and Malik [1] or Arguedas [2] do not speci…cally deal with VAs but address related issues. They examine bargaining between a polluter and a regulator over the value of an emission standard. In contrast with the papers on VAs previously mentioned, they do not assume perfect compliance. But in contrast with ours, the standard is enforceable, albeit imperfectly. In fact, they deal with the negotiation taking place during the process of setting traditional mandatory emission standards.
In this context, they analyze a situation in which the regulator is ready to accept a more lenient standard if it leads the polluter to adopt an abatement technology which reduces enforcement costs. In our setting, the regulator's gain is totally di¤erent. It enters into the VA in order to avoid a politically distorted legislative quota.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of real-world voluntary agreements. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 identi…es the circumstance under which a non-enforceable VA can emerge in equilibrium. The analysis rests on the key property that entering into a VA is a dominant strategy for the polluter. Indeed, either the Polluter enters into the VA to postpone legislative intervention without any intention to abate pollution, or it does so to comply with its commitments because the discounted cost of the legislation is su¢ ciently high.
Accordingly, Section 5 focuses on the regulator's motives to rely on VAs. We show that the VA is more e¢ cient than legislation in cases where lobbying Congress is very e¤ective and when polluters and the regulator do not discount the future heavily. In Section 6, we discuss the robustness of these results and present an extension of the model in which the Polluter competes with a green lobby group to in ‡uence the Congress.
In Section 7, we conclude and discuss policy implications, particularly for climate change policies where VAs are widespread. The key lesson is that non-enforceable voluntary schemes are weak instruments that are potentially useful when political constraints are severe. This is probably the case when regulators seek to cut carbon emissions of energy-intensive industries.
VAs in practice
This section o¤ers an insight into real-world voluntary agreements. It aims to identify key properties which should be incorporated into a relevant model of VAs.
It rests mainly on case studies of real-world voluntary agreements presented in a recent OECD report [13] and in the book by Morgenstern and Pizer [11] who deal more speci…cally with voluntary schemes in the …eld of climate change.
In every VA, a …rm or a group of …rms agree to make environmental e¤orts beyond regulatory compliance. But the design of these voluntary commitments varies signi…cantly. A usual classi…cation distinguishes three broad categories [13] .
Each type ultimately di¤ers with respect to the degree of involvement of the regulator. Under public voluntary programs, the …rms agree to make abatement e¤orts to meet goals which are established by the regulator. This is the most common form of VA in the USA. The 33/50 Program aiming at reducing the release of toxic substances is a well known example [6] . In the case of a negotiated agreement, the …rms and the regulator jointly devise the commitments through bargaining. This type of VA is frequently used in Europe. As an illustration, the European Commission secured negotiated agreements during the 1990s with European (ACEA), Japanese (JAMA) and Korean (KAMA) car manufacturers to reduce new car CO2
emissions.
Under self-regulation or unilateral commitments, the Polluter takes the initia- This section has attempted to highlight three key points associated with VAs, which are developed more fully in the model in the following sections. First, …rms' participation in VAs and compliance are frequently driven by legislative threats.
Second, lobbying usually lessens the strictness and the credibility of these threats. 4 Finally, most VAs are not enforceable.
The model
We depict a policy game with three players: a benevolent Regulator, a …rm (which we call the Polluter) and a Congress responsible for enacting legislation. In the …rst stage, the Regulator and the Polluter negotiate a Voluntary Agreement specifying a level of pollution abatement B to be met by the Polluter. In case of persisting disagreement, the Regulator can ask the Congress to enact legislation. What makes the problem non-trivial is the existence of lobbying in the Congress which prevents the enactment of the socially e¢ cient mandatory policy. In this context, the regulator must choose between two evils: either a piece of legislation distorted by lobbying or a non-enforceable VA.
In reality, certain VAs involve a coalition of polluters represented by an industry association. In our setting, the Polluter can either be a single …rm or an industry.
In the latter case, we assume that the members of the coalition have solved their collective action problem.
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We now enter into the details of the model. Abating pollution entails a cost borne by the Polluter which is described by an increasing and convex function C(B), with C 0 (0) < 1 and C(0) = 0: We do not grant any cost advantage to the VA: abatement costs are the same under the VA and the legislative quota.
Abatement also yields an environmental bene…t. We assume that this bene…t equates with the abatement level B; so that social welfare can be written as
The linearity of the bene…t function simpli…es the notations without altering any results. Under these hypotheses, the abatement level B , which maximizes social welfare, solves:
If the Regulator and the Polluter fail to agree, a piece of legislation mandating a level of abatement L is implemented. In contrast to the VA, we assume that the Polluter perfectly complies with the quota 5 . The abatement quota L is the outcome of a legislative process initiated by the Regulator. This process is subject to lobbying which is modelled using the approach popularized by Grossman and Helpman (see [5] , chapters 7-8). We assume that the Polluter is the only lobby group exerting an in ‡uence in the Congress by making campaign contributions to a median legislator.
In section 5, we analyze a variant where the polluter competes with a green lobby group.
Contributions can be in kind -by working for the legislators, by communicating, or by convincing citizens -or in cash. The Legislator maximizes his probability of re-election facing an implicit challenger by maximizing a weighted sum of the campaign contributions and social welfare. In fact, the Legislator is imagined as a democratically elected legislator who, during a term in Congress, collects campaign contributions he will use in a later, unmodelled, election. In this situation, he is facing a trade-o¤ between (i) higher campaign contributions that help him to convince undecided or uninformed voters but at the cost of distorting policy choices in favor of the contributing group and (ii) a higher social welfare which increases the probability of re-election, given that voters take their welfare into consideration in their choice of candidate. Formally, his utility function is
where L is the legislative quota, x the campaign contribution o¤ered to the Legislator and 2 [0; 1], the exogenously given weight that the Legislator places on social welfare relative to the campaign contribution. One can interpret as re ‡ecting the responsiveness of the Congress to lobbying.
The timing of the legislative subgame is as follows:
1. The Regulator initiates the legislative process by asking Congress to mandate an abatement quota.
The Polluter o¤ers the median Legislator a campaign contribution schedule
x(L) which is contingent on the adopted legislative quota L; this o¤er is assumed to be binding.
Then, the Legislator proposes and rati…es the quota L and receives from the
Polluter the contribution associated with the policy selected.
Note that, in this political procedure, the Regulator does not set the agenda of for any L and x, this quota would be approved by Congress. Thus, the political distortions described above would be circumvented.
If a VA is adopted, but the Polluter chooses not to comply, we suppose that the Regulator initiates the legislative process leading to the quota L. As this takes place in a future period, the Polluter discounts the cost of the sanction. Hence, he complies only if the cost of meeting the target B is less than the discounted cost of the sanction:
where is a multiplicative discount factor 2 (0; 1) re ‡ecting the Polluter's patience 6 .
We assume that the Regulator does not observe the Polluter's discount factor, and hence is not perfectly informed about the Polluter's propensity to comply with the VA:
Assumption 1 is a random variable whose realization is only known to the Polluter when the game begins, but whose distribution is common knowledge. The distribution of is uniform over the interval ;
Introducing uncertainty of compliance can be justi…ed on two grounds. First, it is realistic. The cost of waiting is speci…c to each Polluter or industry as it depends on the weight of irreversible investments, the …rm's …nancial structure and similar idiosyncratic features. 8 Second, the assumption is justi…ed on theoretical grounds:
if the Regulator knew , the outcome of the game would entail a corner solution.
If exceeded a certain threshold, the Polluter would perfectly comply with the VA; if fell below that threshold, the Polluter would not comply at all, and the Regulator would never use a VA.
Assumption 1 implies that the Regulator only knows the compliance probability, denoted p(B); at the beginning of the game. Formally, given the distribution properties, the probability function is
where B min and B max denote the abatement levels such that
Finally, we assume that the Regulator also discounts the social bene…t of future legislation, using the weight "; which is positive but less than one. 
The legislative subgame
We …rst characterize the legislation which emerges in equilibrium. Recall that the
Any feasible contribution must leave him with at least the same utility under the policy L as he would achieve with no contribution. Otherwise, he would reject the o¤er and implement B (his ideal policy when x = 0). Thus, for a contribution to
The Polluter o¤ers a contribution that minimizes his disutility, C(L) + x, subject to the feasibility constraint. Since his disutility is increasing in x, the feasibility constraint will bind. This contribution is implicitly de…ned by V (L; x) = V (B ; 0). Thus, the campaign contribution will depend on the quota as follows:
In light of eqs (1) and (6), the Polluter minimizes
As the function (7) is convex, there is a unique value L that minimizes the Polluter's disutility, where C 0 (L ) = . The Polluter o¤ers the campaign contribution x(L ) in exchange for adoption of the quota L . We collect these …ndings
Since < 1, it follows that L < B .
The VA subgame
We turn next to the analysis of the VA. When negotiating over the level of voluntary abatement B, the Polluter's utility obviously depends on his compliance decision. Given the compliance condition (4), his payo¤ is thus given by
It follows that entering into a VA is a dominant strategy for the Polluter since Lemma 2 The Polluter's payo¤ under a VA is higher than his legislative payo¤ for any level of voluntary abatement:
The intuition of the lemma is simple. The Polluter is willing to participate in any VA because discounting makes the sanction cost [C(L ) + x(L )] strictly less than his disagreement disutility C(L )+x(L ). As a result, the Polluter enters into a VA either because it is less costly than legislation (when B is low), or because he anticipates non-compliance (when B is higher).
This property greatly simpli…es the analysis: non-enforceable VAs are only driven by the preferences of the Regulator.
We now de…ne the Regulator's payo¤ under the VA route:
where " is the rate at which it discounts the social bene…t of future legislation in case of non-compliance. Note that, as is usual in the political economy literature, we assume that the Regulator does not care about the campaign contribution as it is a transfer between the Polluter and the Congress. The alternative assumption that the contribution is a cost included in the welfare function would not reverse the results. It would simply make a VA more likely by creating an additional incentive for the Regulator to use this instrument.
Assumption 1 introduces (one-sided) asymmetric information in the game. In this case, bargaining theory tells us that satisfying players' participation constraints may not be su¢ cient to ensure the existence of ex post e¢ cient bargaining outcomes when payo¤s are correlated (see [12] for a general discussion) 9 . Intuitively, this is so because the informed player has an incentive to manipulate the information he transmits to the uninformed player. More precisely, he has an incentive to pretend he will comply with the VA. As the Regulator is aware of this 'incentive to lie', the minimal level of abatement it might be willing to accept may be strictly higher than the reservation level of the 'high type'Polluter who complies with the VA. However, this general argument does not apply to our case since the Regulator is aware that the polluter is willing to accept any VA (see 5 Regulator' s bargaining payo¤
General properties
Lemma 3 tells us that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a VA is the existence of an abatement level B such that
the highest VA welfare must exceed the equilibrium legislative welfare. In this section, we investigate the properties of W V A in order to identify the circumstances under which condition (10) is satis…ed.
Combining (5) and (9) yields
where
Then, we establish a set of properties of F which will be used to represent W V A diagrammatically.
Lemma 4
We have:
2) F (0) = 0: (Fig. 2a) , non-monotonic (Fig. 2b) or strictly increasing (Fig.   2c) . 
Hence,
; there never exists a VA yielding a higher welfare than the legislative quota. directly depends on the strictness of the quota. Proposition 2 tells us that the former e¤ect unambiguously outweighs the latter.
The result that the more patient the Polluter, the larger the scope for welfareimproving VAs is not surprising as a low discount rate mitigates the VA compliance problem by increasing the size of the sanction (C(L ) + x(L )) borne by the Polluter. The reason for a patient Regulator's tendency to prefer VAs is also simple.
Key in explaining this is the way the Regulator values non-compliance:
In the case where the Polluter fails to comply, the Regulator's utility is "W (L ) which corresponds to the delayed implementation of the legislative quota. This bene…t obviously increases with "; making the use of VAs more attractive.
Robustness of the results
The model presented here is fairly simplistic. It is worth discussing the robustness of the insights it gives and some possible extensions. Three criticisms/questions come quickly to mind: the impact of bargaining power on outcomes, the fact that there is no green lobby group acting in the Congress and the assumption that polluters have solved their collective action problem. We now consider these points. Given that the Regulator seeks to maximize welfare, it is very intuitive that Proposition 3 Social welfare associated with a non-enforceable VA increases with the Regulator's bargaining power.
Bargaining power
Proof. See the appendix.
Lobbying by a green group and free riding
The fact that the Polluter is the only active lobby group in the Congress and that free riding does not hinder its lobbying e¤orts may pose a problem as one could expect better legislative outcomes once these assumptions are relaxed.
In this subsection, we adopt a common agency framework in which the Legislator is the agent of two principals -the Polluter and a green lobby group -both o¤ering contributions. For the sake of tractability, we only consider VAs involving perfect compliance in equilibrium (p(B V A ) = 1) and we assume that the Regulator has all the bargaining power. Formally, the Legislator's utility function is now
where x P (L) and x G (L) are the Polluter's and the green group's contingent contribution schedules, respectively.
We also introduce free riding considerations, admittedly roughly, by assuming that the Polluter's lobbying cost is x P (L)=(1 ) for making a contribution x P (L)
to the median legislator with 0 < 1. is a new parameter capturing the idea that, when some …rms within an industry fail to cooperate, remaining contributors should make additional e¤orts. Note that is inversely related to lobbying e¤ectiveness. Under this assumption, Polluter's legislative pay o¤ is now
Turning next to the green lobby group, we suppose that it is only concerned with the environmental bene…t of legislation so that its utility under legislation is
with 0 < 1: Note that, when > , the green group is less e¤ective in lobbying activities than the Polluter.
The derivation of the political equilibrium closely follows Grossman and Helpman [5] and is left out for ease of presentation. When the lobby groups choose their contributions, the key di¤erence from the previous sections is that "walk-ing away" no longer implies that the Legislator will implement the optimal quota B : Rather, if a group abstains from lobbying, the Legislator implements the best legislation given the other group's contribution.
In addition, we assume that contributions schedules are globally compensating.
This means that each contribution function "compensates" the group for its di¤er-ent evaluations of the two policy options. Accordingly, the contribution functions are given by
where L P and L G denote the legislative quotas when the Polluter or the green group are not involved, respectively. This assumption is routinely made in the literature because it is necessary to pin down equilibrium contributions (for detailed explanations and justi…cations, see [5] , pp 265-270) 12 . Plugging (13) in the Legislator's objective function (12) and omitting constant terms, we obtain the following maximization problem
We derive the …rst-order condition and solve for L so that equilibrium legislation
Note that the quota (14) If is su¢ ciently low -that is, if < (1 )
VA even yields the …rst-best abatement level B :
The …rst part of Proposition 5 is in line with previous results (the impact of and ). The in ‡uence of lobbying e¤ectiveness' parameters and is less intuitive. And the fact that voluntary abatement can be socially optimal when is su¢ ciently low is clearly a new and striking result. In order to understand the underlying intuition of these results, recall that the Regulator'ability to implement a strict VA is constrained by the compliance condition
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This expression makes clear that the higher the value of , the wider the room for a strict VA with which the Polluter will comply. The reason is extremely simple. As compared to the preceding sections in which was set to zero, our new assumption increases the Polluter's lobbying cost x P (L )=(1 ) and thus the scope for VAs by increasing the size of compliance incentives. Now, let us substitute (13) in (15). The compliance condition becomes
It is then clear that the room for a strict VA increases with L P . And L P is high when the green lobby is very e¤ective (a small ) or when the Legislator is strongly responsive to lobbying (a low ). If L P is su¢ ciently high, we can perfectly observe a VA involving B . This occurs when C(B ) < C(L P ) as we observe perfect compliance with
Therefore, this extension does not change the general message that VAs are suitable in contexts in which the responsiveness of the Congress to lobbying is high. But, in addition to this, it shows that the introduction of competition with a green lobby group or a decrease in the Polluter's lobbying e¤ectiveness (by setting 6 = 0) tend to increase the scope for VAs by raising the Polluter's lobbying cost and thus his propensity to comply.
However, note that the robustness of the particular result that the VA can be socially optimal is questionable. In fact, the size of the left hand side of (15) directly depends on the assumption that the Polluter's contribution schedule is globally compensating. This assumption, though a usual and a necessary tool to derive equilibrium contributions, clearly determines a high level of contribution since it essentially means that the Legislator is able to extract the entire lobbying surplus from the two groups.
Conclusion
We have developed a model of non-enforceable VAs under the threat of a legislative quota with two main assumptions. The …rst is that the Polluter is an active lobby group in the Congress in ‡uencing the legislative process. This political distortion makes possible the entry of the Regulator into a VA which avoids the enactment of a piece of politically distorted legislation. The fact that the VA contract is non-binding is the second key assumption. As a result, the Regulator can only punish a non-complying Polluter by implementing the legislation at a later stage.
We show that a non-enforceable VA can be a better instrument than a legislative quota in speci…c circumstances. This is particularly the case when lobbying exerts a strong in ‡uence on the Congress. Interestingly, the result is not very intuitive because a distorted legislative process yields two opposite e¤ects. On the one hand, it obviously reduces the strictness of the legislative quota. On the other hand, it damages VA social welfare since a lax legislative quota provides lower compliance incentives. Our analysis shows that the former e¤ect is stronger that the latter.
This …nding contradicts the recurrent policy recommendation that VAs should be developed under credible legislative or regulatory threats (for instance, see [13] ). When threats are credible and su¢ ciently strong, we show that legislation is preferable. VAs are also shown to yield a higher social welfare than legislative quotas when the polluter and the regulator do not discount future costs and bene…ts heavily.
To conclude, the main …nding of the paper is that non-binding VAs are weak instruments which are potentially useful in adverse political contexts. In practice, they are particularly widespread in climate change policies. Do our results suggest that VAs are suitable for these policies? To a large extent, answering this question is speculative as political contexts vary greatly across countries and the key parameters of the model (e.g., ) are not quanti…able in a consistent and comparable way.
Nevertheless, our model pinpoints two arguments in favor of climate change
VAs. First, they have mostly been developed in energy-intensive industries (steel, glass, cement, chemicals, etc.) which are typically very e¤ective in lobbying activities. One reason being that free riding is less likely in sectors where companies are few and large and in which energy (and thus abatement) costs represent a signi…cant share of production costs. Second, climate change is a long term policy concern for which immediate action is less crucial than mid-or long-term policy strategies. As a result, the regulators' cost of waiting is probably low in comparison with other policy areas. This promotes the adoption of VAs since a key risk associated with their use is to delay legislative intervention in the event of non-compliance.
Our model is quite simplistic and several extensions or improvements could be pursued. In our view, the two most promising lines of research are the following.
First, one should try to be more speci…c as to the type of VAs analyzed. 13 In this regard, it would be interesting to investigate speci…cally the case of industry-wide agreement while relaxing the assumption that …rms fully overcome their free-rider di¢ culties. Second, the hypothesis of perfect information about abatement cost should be relaxed. This would probably reduce the scope for VAs since information asymmetry is particularly detrimental in bargaining contexts.
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Appendix

Proof of Lemma 4
To begin with, we di¤erentiate F which leads to
Then we consider the di¤erent properties in turn.
1) We have
1 (since by hypothesis).
2) Given (11), F (0) = 0 is obvious.
Therefore, the …rst term of (16) 
which is obviously negative (since C 0 (B); C " (B) and W 0 (B) > 0): In addition,
It implies that there exists a unique interior maximum de…ned by the …rst order
Proof of Proposition 2
We interpret …rst Part 1) of Proposition 1 where
consider Part 2) where W (B max ) < "W (L ):
In this case, Proposition 1 tells us that a welfare-improving VA exists if either a)
assuming that the Regulator has all the bargaining power, the equilibrium VA is
We now examine the in ‡uence of the parameters ; "; on these results by distinguishing two subcases . We now study the properties of g to identify how ; "; and in ‡uence its sign.
It is convenient to develop g( ; "; ) as follows
Di¤erentiating (17) with respect to " and , substituting F 0 (B) = 0 and rearranging yields
Both derivatives are positive, meaning that rising " and/or promotes the existence of welfare-improving VAs.
Turning next to the parameter ; note that L B min is equivalent to 2 In between these two values of L ; simulations available upon request con…rm that g is positive for small values of and then becomes positive beyond a certain threshold.
Case 2:
In this case, the legislative quota Pareto dominates the VA . Here, we establish that, if ; "; and are such that
is not binding and the properties of ; "; and identi…ed in Case 1 are su¢ cient to de…ne the scope for a welfare-improving agreement.
Summary
According to subcase 1a, there exists a welfare-improving VA if and are such that < : If + ; the analysis of subcase 1b tells us that we have a VA if is not too high and/or if and " are su¢ ciently high. Finally, the condition of Case 2 is not binding. These elements converge to establish that VAs emerge when is low and/or when and " are high.
Proof of Proposition 4
We obviously restrict the analysis to the case where a VA is feasible, that is when 
Proof of Proposition 5
We …rst identify the highest level of abatement B min below which the Polluter complies with the VA. It is implicitly de…ned by
L P is the equilibrium of the single-lobby game in which the contribution
is still given by (6) while the green group maximizes L x G (L): Deriving the …rst order condition immediately yields L P = (1 (1 )) = . Plugging this expression in (18) and solving for B min leads to
Establishing the second part of the proposition is now straightforward. Contrary to Case 1, W is no longer monotonic between B min and L , implying
Let us …rst identify
which is a polynomial of degree 2. Solving for
As a result, B min > L 0 is equivalent to B min > (2= ) L : Substituting (14) and (19) in this inequality and rearranging leads to p . 4 Put di¤erently, VAs are used in contexts where mandatory intervention is di¢ cult. This is very intuitive. Why would public authorities rely on voluntary actions by polluters if legislation was easy to pass? 5 Imperfect compliance with mandatory standards is sometimes observed in reality. However, such standards are at least enforceable in contrast with most VAs.
Our assumption makes this di¤erence very clear-cut. 6 In (4), x(L) is discounted in line with the idea that discovering non-compliance and launching a legislative process takes time. One may rightly argue that the lobby group contributes before legislation is enacted. This could justify the introduction of a speci…c discount factor for x(L). This alternative assumption would not alter the results qualitatively. It would simply modify the composition of the sanction cost, by giving more weight to x(L) than to C(L): 7 The uniformity of the distribution simpli…es the presentation of the results.
The results will be valid with other distributions, assuming the cumulative and density are positive and increasing on the whole interval. 8 Note that, when the VA involves a sector, discount rates may di¤er across …rms. We assume here that …rms have solved their collective action problem. This implies that, inter alia, they have reached a consensus on a collective discount rate. 9 A bargaining outcome is said to be ex post e¢ cient if and only if after all the information is revealed the players' payo¤s associated with the bargaining outcome are Pareto-e¢ cient. Payo¤s are said to be correlated when the piece of private information (here ) a¤ects both players'payo¤s. 10 Under this assumption, L = = , B min = (1= ) p ( ); B max = (1= ) p ( + ) and the compliance probability of Eq. (7) 12 If one does not need to compute equilibrium contributions, assuming di¤eren-tiability of contribution functions is su¢ cient to derive the political equilibrium.
Di¤erentiability implies that contributions are locally compensating in equilibrium. 13 As done by Lyon and Maxwell [13] for instance. 
